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I.

INTRODUCTION

At the close of the first half of the twentieth century, it was
clear that the waters of the states “were only marginally suitable for
even low-quality uses such as irrigation, stock watering and
1
industrial intake.” Early federal efforts to control water pollution
presumed that “the only water pollution problems worthy of being
addressed flowed from sanitary sewers[,] . . . from municipal waste
treatment plants[,] . . . and from industries dumping large loads of
†
Sherry A. Enzler J.D., Ph.D. is a Research Fellow in the Department of
Forest Resources and a Resident Fellow at the Institute on the Environment at the
University of Minnesota.
1. Robert L. Glicksman & Matthew R. Batzel, Science, Politics, Law, and the
Arc of the Clean Water Act: The Role of Assumptions in the Adoption of a Pollution Control
Landmark, 32 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 99, 99 (2010).
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raw organic waste material into waterways.” But as early as 1967, at
least one forward-thinking observer noted:
I am convinced that both from a technical and from an
economic point of view most point source pollution can
and will be brought under control in this country in the
next 5 to 10 years. As this happens the problem of
pollution from non-point or diffused sources will become
our greatest challenge. In no area will the challenge be
greater than in agricultural pollution. When we finally
succeed in collecting and adequately treating our
industrial and municipal wastes we will very likely find that
many of our rivers are still dirty, unsafe, and
3
unusable . . . .
That day is at hand. Today “nonpoint” water pollution from
agricultural pollution in particular poses one of the single largest
4
remaining threats to our national water quality. Minnesota, like
many other states, struggles to address the impacts of agricultural
5
In southern Minnesota, for
pollution on its water resource.
example, the state has spent almost one billion dollars to clean the
Minnesota River, much of it invested in voluntary agricultural
incentive programs, but “the Minnesota River is, well, not much
6
better than it was in 1990.” A Minnesota Pollution Control Agency
(MPCA) report, issued in May 2011, documented the failure of
voluntary agricultural programs to abate water pollution on the

2. N. William Hines, History of the 1972 Clean Water Act: The Story Behind How
the 1972 Act Became the Capstone on a Decade of Extraordinary Environmental Reform 4
(Univ. of Iowa Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 12-12, 2012), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2045069.
3. James M. Quigley, Water Quality and Agriculture in the United States: An
Overall View, in AGRICULTURE AND THE QUALITY OF OUR ENVIRONMENT 134 (Nyle C.
Brady ed., 1967).
4. See generally Donn W. Furman, Poisoned Waters: An Examination of
Agricultural Water Pollution, 3 SAN JOAQUIN AGRIC. L. REV. 99 (1993); James M.
McElfish, Jr. et al., Inventing Nonpoint Controls: Methods, Metrics and Results, 17 VILL.
ENVTL. L.J. 87 (2006); J.B. Ruhl, Farms, Their Environmental Harms, and
Environmental Law, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 263 (2000).
5. See McElfish et al., supra note 4, at 128–64 (discussing Minnesota’s various
programs to address pollution from agricultural and forestry sources).
6. Josephine Marcotty, Minnesota River Still Ailing, STAR TRIB., May 10, 2011,
http://www.startribune.com/local/121530289.html
(referencing
BENJAMIN
LUNDEEN & MICHAEL KOSCHAK, MINN. POLLUTION CONTROL AGENCY, REVISITING THE
MINNESOTA RIVER ASSESSMENT PROJECT: AN EVALUATION OF FISH AND INVERTEBRATE
COMMUNITY PROGRESS (2011) [hereinafter REVISITING THE MINNESOTA RIVER],
available
at
http://www.pca.state.mn.us/index.php/view-document.html?gid
=15821).
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Minnesota River, causing many to wonder “whether the state’s
largely voluntary approach to protecting its waters is working” and
whether we can continue to rely on “random acts of conservation”
7
to address agricultural contamination of our water resources.
Our failure to regulate agricultural point sources outside of
8
concentrated animal feeding operations (CAFO) and nonpoint
agricultural pollution has come at a tremendous cost to both our
nation’s waters and the waters of the individual states. Farmland
consumes about one half of the landmass in the contiguous United
States, and water pollution emanating from agricultural sources is
the largest remaining contributor of water pollution in the United
9
States, “affecting 70 percent of impaired rivers and streams and
10
forty-nine percent of impaired lake acreage.” Fifty-three percent
of Minnesota’s landscape, or 24.7 million acres, is dedicated to
11
agricultural production.
The breadth of the agricultural footprint on our nation’s
waters is so significant that one commentator pondered whether we
have abdicated the management of our nation’s natural resources
to farmers, including our water: “‘Farmers and ranchers control
how most of our land is used and managed . . . . They are literally, the
most important soil, water, fish, wildlife, and recreational managers in the
U.S.’ They have not, however, been particularly good stewards of
12
our water resources . . . .”
On January 17, 2012, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) Administrator Lisa Jackson, U.S. Department of Agriculture
(USDA) Secretary Tom Vilsack, and Minnesota Governor Mark
Dayton signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) for a
7. Id.
8. Only CAFOs are treated as point sources requiring a National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit under the CWA. 40 C.F.R.
§ 122.23(a) (2008). Not all animal feedlots are considered CAFOs requiring an
NPDES permit, however. Generally, to be classified as a CAFO, an animal feedlot
must confine more than 1000 animal units. Id.
9. Ruhl, supra note 4, at 288.
10. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY & U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., CLEAN WATER ACTION
PLAN: RESTORING AND PROTECTING AMERICA’S WATERS 9 (1998).
11. MINN. POLLUTION CONTROL AGENCY, MINNESOTA’S NONPOINT SOURCE
MANAGEMENT PROGRAM PLAN 2008 § 8-259 (2008) [hereinafter MPCA].
12. Douglas R. Williams, When Voluntary, Incentive-Based Controls Fail:
Structuring a Regulatory Response to Agricultural Nonpoint Source Water Pollution, 9
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 21, 22 (2002) (first alteration in original) (emphasis added)
(quoting CRAIG A. COX, WHAT SHOULD BE THE ROLE OF RESOURCE STEWARDSHIP IN
FUTURE FARM POLICY? (2001), available at http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/handle
/33062).
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voluntary agriculture certification program intended to address the
13
challenges posed by agriculture to Minnesota’s water quality. The
program, quickly dubbed the Ag Certainty Program, will release
farmers from potential future water quality regulations for up to
ten years if they voluntarily implement Best Management Practices
14
(BMP) designed to reduce water pollution.
The federal-state
partners lauded the new program as a “bold” step to protect our
15
But the program, which will be
rivers, lakes, and streams.
managed by the Minnesota Department of Agriculture (MnDAg),
quickly met with criticism. Environmental interests viewed the
proposal with a high degree of skepticism, characterizing it as yet
another voluntary scheme to address agricultural water pollution
and observing that Minnesota’s forty-year history with voluntary
programs has resulted in insufficient reductions of agricultural
pollution in our lakes, rivers, and streams—“[the Ag Certainty
Program] enshrines the old ways, defying all rationality,” observed
16
Whitney Clark of Friends of the Mississippi River. Agricultural
interests, on the other hand, are hesitant to endorse the Ag
17
Certainty Program, noting the “devil’s in the details.” Can the Ag
Certainty Program produce significant improvements to our water
quality, or is this yet another voluntary incentive program, which
like so many before it is doomed to failure? The outcome of this
experiment will depend, in large part, on whether this new
voluntary program embodies essential characteristics of successful
voluntary programs.
Part II of this article outlines the Clean Water Act (CWA)
framework for cleaning the nation’s waters and its treatment of
agricultural pollution. Part III provides a brief analysis of our
13. Stephanie Hemphill, New Program to Protect Water Quality; Details to Be
Worked Out, MINN. PUB. RADIO NEWS, Jan. 17, 2012, http://minnesota.publicradio
.org/display/web/2012/01/17/water-quality/.
14. Id.; Minnesota Agricultural Water Quality Certification Program, MINN.
DEPARTMENT AGRIC., http://www.mda.state.mn.us/protecting/waterprotection
/awqcprogram/awqcprogramfaq.aspx (last visited Jan. 1, 2013).
15. Press Release, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Administrator Jackson, Secretary
Vilsack Sign Historic Agreement with State of Minnesota to Help Farmers Protect
Rivers, Streams and Lakes (Jan. 17, 2012), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov
/opa/admpress.nsf/0/9E2AAEF7CBCC2D468525798800692A58.
16. Josephine Marcotty, Minnesota Launches Mississippi River Cleanup Effort,
STAR TRIB., Jan. 17, 2012, http://www.startribune.com/local/137454108.html
?refer=y; Marcotty, supra note 6.
17. Sara Wyant, Farmers, Environmental Groups Search for “Regulatory Certainty”,
AGRIPULSE (Jan. 18, 2012), http://www.agri-pulse.com/Farmers-environmental
-groups-search-for-regulatory-certainty-01182012.asp.
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attempts to address agricultural nonpoint pollution with voluntary
programs and the essential elements necessary for successful
voluntary programs. Part IV of this article describes and analyzes
the potential opportunities and pitfalls presented by the proposed
Agricultural Certainty Program.
II. HOW DID WE GET TO THIS POINT? THE CLEAN WATER ACT AND
AGRICULTURAL POLLUTION
The primary objective of the CWA is to “restore and maintain
the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s
18
waters.” To achieve this objective Congress set out a number of
interim and long-term goals, the most immediate of which was the
“swimmable fishable” goal—by 1983, water quality, wherever
attainable, should be sufficient “for the protection and propagation
of fish, shellfish, and wildlife and provide for recreation in and on
19
the water.” The CWA also had the loftier goal of eliminating all
20
pollution discharges by 1985.
While early federal pollution
control efforts focused on discharges from industrial and
municipal point sources, Congress in 1987 amended the CWA to
clarify the role of nonpoint sources in meeting these national goals,
directing the adoption and implementation of programs to control
21
nonpoint sources of pollution.
A.

The Clean Water Act Framework
1.

Water Quality Standards and Effluent Limits

The CWA was the culmination of a multi-generational attempt
22
to address the quality of our nation’s waters. The framework of
the CWA was greatly influenced by the 1948 Water Pollution
23
Control Act, which was premised on the assumption that the states
18. Clean Water Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 101(a), 86 Stat. 816
(codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006)).
19. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2).
20. Id. § 1251(a)(1).
21. Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, § 319, 10 Stat. 52 (codified
at 33 U.S.C. § 1329).
22. Hines, supra note 2, at 2. Hines provides an excellent overview of
national attempts to control water pollution dating back to the Rivers and Harbors
Act of 1899. Id. at 6.
23. Water Pollution Control Act, Pub. L. No. 80-845, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948).
Hines notes that historically there was significant debate over the scope of the
federal role in regulating water pollution. Until the mid-twentieth century the
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and local units of government were primarily responsible for
24
But by the mid-1960s it became
regulating water pollution.
apparent that state and local control of water pollution was
generating a race to the bottom as southern and western states
used the promise of lax water regulations to lure northern
industries to relocate. This prompted Congress, in 1965, to design
a national regulatory water quality floor in the guise of ambient
25
water quality standards.
Setting and implementing the new
ambient water quality standards was largely left to the states and
26
involved a three-step process. The states were first required to
27
designate use classifications for each water body, including:
“public water supplies, propagation of fish and wildlife,
recreational purposes, and agricultural, industrial, and other
28
legitimate uses.” States were then directed to set ambient water
29
quality standards to support the water body’s intended use. These
water quality standards were submitted to the Department of the
30
Interior for approval. After setting water quality standards, states
31
were required to develop water quality implementation plans.
Hypothetically the federal government could enforce state water
32
quality standards but rarely took steps to do so. By 1970 only half
federal government limited its role in water management to federally defined
navigable waters. Hines, supra note 2, at 4–11. The U.S. Supreme Court’s 1966
ruling in United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224 (1966), changed the playing
field. In Standard Oil, the Supreme Court reversed its prior decisions and held
that the 1899 Refuse Act gave the Army Corps of Engineers broad authority to
regulate pollution discharges into navigable waters regardless of whether the
pollution discharge impeded navigation. Id. at 228–30; see also Hines, supra note 2,
at 23, 28–30 (discussing the influence of the Standard Oil case on the development
of the CWA).
24. Glicksman & Batzel, supra note 1, at 101–02.
25. Id. at 102. The term “ambient water quality standards” refers to the water
quality standards for individual bodies of water, such as a river, lake, stream, or
wetland. See generally U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, METHODOLOGY FOR DERIVING
AMBIENT WATER QUALITY CRITERIA FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN HEALTH (2000),
available at http://water.epa.gov/scitech/swguidance/standards/upload/2005_05
_06_criteria_humanhealth_method_complete.pdf (explaining the criteria for
setting ambient water quality).
26. Hines, supra note 2, at 20.
27. Water Quality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-234, § 5(a), 79 Stat. 903.
28. Id. § 5(c)(3).
29. Id.
30. Hines, supra note 2, at 20–21.
31. Id. at 20 (citing U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, GUIDELINES FOR ESTABLISHING
WATER QUALITY STANDARDS FOR INTERSTATE WATERS (1966)).
32. Glicksman & Batzel, supra note 1, at 102–04; see also Hines, supra note 2,
at 21.
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of the states had approved water quality standards and Congress
concluded that present attempts to abate water pollution were
33
wholly inadequate.
In 1972, Congress enacted the CWA to address the
34
shortcomings of the 1948 Water Pollution Control Act. The CWA
encompasses a dual system of water quality standards: ambient
35
water quality standards and effluent limits.
While the Water
Pollution Control Act relied exclusively on ambient water quality
standards, the CWA recognized that use of ambient water quality
standards alone permitted pollution sources to take advantage of
the assimilative capacity of water bodies to accommodate pollution
36
discharges. That is, under the Water Pollution Control Act, once
pollution was discharged by a source into a water body, the
pollution mingled with pollution discharged from other sources,
and it became difficult to tell what pollution came from what
discharge source and which source was responsible for the ultimate
exceedance of ambient water quality standards. This made it
difficult to bring an enforcement action against individual
discharge sources because science was unable to identify a causeand-effect link between ambient water quality and any given
37
pollutant discharge.
By designing dual water-quality standards,
Congress intended to overcome these and other shortcomings of
38
the Water Pollution Control Act.
Structurally, the CWA carried forward the requirement that
states set use-based ambient water quality standards for their
39
intrastate waters subject to EPA approval. If a state failed to adopt
ambient water quality standards or the EPA determined that the
standards were inadequate, the EPA was authorized to promulgate
40
water quality standards for the state. But the CWA did not rely
solely on ambient water quality standards. To resolve the scientific
uncertainty challenge to implementation of ambient water quality

33. Glicksman & Batzel, supra note 1, at 102–04.
34. Id.
35. An effluent limit is a restriction on the “quantities, rates, and
concentrations of chemical, physical, biological, and other constituents which are
discharged from point sources” into navigable waters. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(11)
(2006).
36. Glicksman & Batzel, supra note 1, at 119.
37. Id. at 120–21.
38. Id. at 119.
39. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a).
40. Id. § 1313(b).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2013

7

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 3 [2013], Art. 16

966

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:3

41

standards, the CWA relied on effluent limits. Effluent limits were
based, at least initially, on best available technology to control
pollution at the point of discharge, thus eliminating the need to
premise discharge standards on a causal link between the quality of
42
the discharge and ambient water quality.
Effluent limits were
applied to water discharges from each individual point source or
43
group of point sources. Ambient water quality standards under
44
the CWA thus became the water quality floor. Effluent limits were
met by applying best-available technology to individual point
sources in anticipation that the cumulative application of effluent
limits across point sources would bring us closer to meeting
ambient water quality standards and eventually permit us to meet
45
the no-discharge aspirations of the CWA.
2.

The Point Source (NPDES) Program

The CWA prohibits point sources from discharging any
46
pollutant into navigable waters without first obtaining a National
47
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit, which
48
requires permittees to meet technology-based effluent limits.
Effluent limits are set by industry category and are subject to
adjustment if the receiving water body does not meet ambient
49
water quality standards.
In 1974, the EPA delegated NPDES
50
permitting authority to the MPCA.
A point source is defined by the CWA as “any discernible,
confined and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any
41. See Glicksman & Batzel, supra note 1, at 119–20 (discussing congressional
reasoning for adoption of both ambient water quality limits and effluent limits).
42. Id.
43. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b), 1312.
44. Glicksman & Batzel, supra note 1, at 124.
45. Id. at 125 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 92-911, at 101–02 (1972)).
46. Pollution is defined as “the man-made or man-induced alteration of the
chemical, physical, biological, and radiological integrity of water.” 33 U.S.C.
§ 1362(19).
47. Id. §§ 1311(a), 1342(a).
48. Id. §§ 1318, 1342.
49. See generally Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692 (D.C.
Cir. 1974) (containing a detailed discussion of the operation of the CWA and how
effluent limits are set).
50. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (permitting the EPA to delegate management of
the NPDES program to the states); MINN. POLLUTION CONTROL AGENCY, MUNICIPAL
SEPARATE STORM SEWER SYSTEM (MS4) GENERAL PERMIT REISSUANCE PROCESS AND
REQUIREMENTS 1 (2012), available at http://www.pca.state.mn.us/index.php/view
-document.html?gid=17090.
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pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container,
rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or
other floating craft, from which pollutants are or may be
51
discharged.”
The definition of pollution includes “agricultural
52
waste discharge[].” A plain reading of these definitions suggests
that agricultural drainage systems would seemingly meet the literal
definition of a point source. However, the EPA was reluctant to
include agricultural operations in the NPDES program from day
one, instead adopting regulations exempting agricultural point
53
sources from the NPDES program.
The Natural Resources
Defense Council (NRDC) challenged the EPA exemption, arguing
that the EPA had no legal authority to exempt a whole class of
54
point sources from the NPDES program. The EPA rationalized
the exemption not on the basis that agricultural operations were
not point sources, but rather that it was difficult to set effluent
55
limits for agricultural operations and that the sheer number of
56
The D.C.
agricultural operations made regulation difficult.
Circuit Court rejected the feasibility argument, noting that the
NPDES program allowed the EPA to issue NPDES permits without
57
setting effluent limits. The EPA could issue NPDES permits while
developing the technology necessary to set technological effluent
58
limits for agricultural point sources. The court also rejected the
EPA’s numbers argument because the EPA had the legal authority
to issue general NPDES permits for classes of discharge sources, but
the EPA had no legal authority to exempt an entire class of point

51. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (emphasis added).
52. Id. § 1362(6); see also Alfred R. Light, The Myth of Everglades Settlement, 11
ST. THOMAS L. REV. 55, 57 (1998). See generally David Zaring, Agriculture, Nonpoint
Source Pollution, and Regulatory Control: The Clean Water Act’s Bleak Present and Future,
20 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 515 (1996) (discussing attempts to address nonpoint
pollution using the CWA).
53. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1372 (D.C. Cir.
1977). The EPA regulation exempted certain farming operations, including
CAFOs and “all irrigation return flows from areas of less than 3000 contiguous
acres or 3000 noncontiguous acres that use the same drainage system; all
nonfeedlot, nonirrigation agricultural point sources; and separate storm sewers
containing only storm runoff uncontaminated by any industrial or commercial
activity,” from the NPDES program. Id.
54. Id. at 1373.
55. Id. at 1377–78.
56. Id. at 1380.
57. Id. at 1378–79.
58. Id.
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59

discharge sources from the NPDES program. The court ordered
the EPA to apply the NPDES program to agricultural point
60
sources.
Shortly after the EPA promulgated regulations for agricultural
point sources, Congress amended the CWA to exempt both
agricultural stormwater runoff and “return flows from irrigated
agriculture” (irrigation return flow exemption) from the NPDES
61
program. Neither Congress nor the EPA have defined the terms
agriculture stormwater runoff or irrigation return flow, nor have
they addressed the scope of these exemptions. It is unclear, for
example, whether the agricultural storm water and irrigation
return flow exemptions apply to ditch systems, which collect
discharges from agricultural operations where such ditch systems
are built, maintained, and managed not by individual farmers, but
62
by county boards sitting as drainage ditch authorities. At least one
court has found the agricultural stormwater runoff and irrigation
return flow exemptions apply only to those entities actually engaged
63
in agriculture. Likewise, while it is clear that the CWA exemptions
64
include diffuse runoff from agricultural lands, it is unclear
whether the exemptions extend to drainage ditch systems that carry
waters from both agricultural and non-agricultural sources. Thus,
Hanson and Bender argue, the point source definitions would
seemingly apply to agriculture runoff collected and conveyed
65
through ditch systems, such as the 20,000 miles of man-made
ditches in Minnesota that carry nutrient- and sediment-laden farm
66
field runoff directly into Minnesota’s rivers, lakes, and streams.
59. Id. at 1381–82.
60. Id. at 1383.
61. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1362(14), 1342(l) (2006). See generally Andrew C. Hanson &
David C. Bender, Irrigation Return Flow or Discrete Discharge? Why Water Pollution from
Cranberry Bogs Should Fall Within the Clean Water Act’s NPDES Program, 37 ENVTL. L.
339 (2007) (containing a detailed discussion of the irrigation return flow
exemption for agriculture).
62. See generally MINN. STAT. § 103E.011 (2010) (outlining the powers of
drainage ditch authorities). A drainage ditch authority is the board of county
commissioners or joint county drainage authority with jurisdiction over a drainage
ditch system in its county or counties. Id. § 103E.005, subdiv. 4, 9.
63. Reynolds v. Rick’s Mushroom Serv., Inc. 246 F. Supp. 2d 449, 456–57
(E.D. Pa. 2003).
64. See discussion supra Part II.A.2.
65. See Hanson & Bender, supra note 61, at 349.
66. Mark Steil, New Study Targets Farm Ditches, MINN. PUB.
RADIO NEWS (Mar. 2, 2006), http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display/web/2006
/03/01/ditchstudy/; see also Hanson & Bender, supra note 61, at 348–50
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Nonetheless, because of the stormwater and irrigation return flow
exemptions, agricultural point sources have largely been lumped in
with, and are treated as, non-regulated nonpoint sources.
3.

Controlling Nonpoint Pollution

Even in 1972 Congress understood that addressing the
nation’s water-quality challenges required “vigorously” addressing
67
nonpoint pollution, noting that “[s]ediment, often associated with
agricultural activities, is by volume our major pollutant, not only
from the degrading effect of the sediment, but because it also
68
transports other pollutants.” But control of nonpoint pollutants,
including agricultural pollution, is largely left to the individual
69
states. Nor is the term “nonpoint pollution” defined in the CWA,
although the term is understood to mean “pollution that arises
from many dispersed activities over large areas . . . not traceable to
70
any single discrete source.”
Congress’s decision to exclude nonpoint pollution, and
agricultural water pollution in particular, from the CWA regulatory
scheme was based on a number of factors. First, from a technical
perspective, the means of controlling and measuring nonpoint
71
pollution was difficult.
Unlike point sources, pollution from
nonpoint sources is diffuse and arguably difficult to monitor,
making the enforcement of effluent limits, which require
monitoring at the point of discharge, with then-existing
72
73
technology, difficult, although not impossible. Even if it were
possible to set effluent limits, these sources are unlike point sources

(discussing ditches as conduits for fertilizer-laden runoff).
67. H.R. REP. NO. 92-911, at 109 (1972).
68. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON PUBLIC WORKS, 93D CONG., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, at 1470–71 (Comm.
Print 1973).
69. JAMES SALZMAN & BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND
POLICY 153 (2d ed. 2007).
70. League of Wilderness Defenders v. Forsgren, 309 F.3d 1181, 1184 (9th
Cir. 2002); see also United States v. Earth Scis., Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 373 (10th Cir.
1979).
71. Glicksman & Batzel, supra note 1, at 115.
72. Jonathan Cannon, A Bargain for Clean Water, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 608,
615–16 (2008) (citing S. REP. NO. 92-414 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3668, 3706 (alleging that “many nonpoint sources of pollution are beyond present
technology of control.”)).
73. Cannon notes that since 1972, there have been a number of projects that
have demonstrated the ability to reduce nonpoint pollution. Id.
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that could be controlled through technology-driven abatement
mechanisms.
Controlling diffuse pollution requires land-use
controls, and “[w]hat was the EPA supposed to do, tell farmers how
74
to farm?” The inability to control pollution from diffuse sources
does not explain, however, the exemption from regulation of
agricultural drainage conveyance systems, which technically meet
the definition of a point source and are, nonetheless, exempted
75
from regulation as point sources. And even if we presume that
diffuse sources of pollution are technically difficult to monitor and
abate, technical difficulty has not stopped Congress or the EPA
from addressing equally challenging environmental dilemmas;
indeed, “[e]very environmental program of the past thirty years
has had to grapple with scientific uncertainty . . . [and]
76
inconsistencies.”
Second, it is possible Congress believed that it would have to
regulate land use to control nonpoint pollution, and it was
77
reluctant to do so. This observation is supported by the “scant”
CWA legislative history, which suggests that the “states feared the
prospect of ‘federal land use’ [control] and fought to retain [local]
control over land use by maintaining control over supervision of
78
nonpoint source pollution.”
Third, there is a national tendency to romanticize farming,
which undermines the ability to regulate agriculture.
The
tendency harkens back to the revolutionary era and Jefferson’s
79
concept of agrarian democracy. De Tocqueville, in his discourse
on democracy in America, argues that one of the foundations of
American democracy is the abundant landmass available to millions
80
of Americans for cultivation. Democracy in America is grounded in
74. William L. Andreen, Water Quality Today—Has the Clean Water Act Been a
Success?, 55 ALA. L. REV. 537, 562 (2004).
75. See supra Part II.A.2.
76. Linda A. Malone, Myths and Truths That Ended the 2000 TMDL Program, 20
PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 63, 76 (2002) [hereinafter Malone, Myths and Truths]; see also
OLIVER HOUCK, THE CLEAN WATER ACT TMDL PROGRAM: LAW, POLICY AND
IMPLEMENTATION 87 (1999)
77. Cannon, supra note 72, at 616; Malone, Myths and Truths, supra note 76,
at 77–78.
78. Malone, Myths and Truths, supra note 76, at 78–79.
79. See generally Linda A. Malone, Reflections on the Jeffersonian Ideal of an
Agrarian Democracy and the Emergence of an Agricultural and Environmental Ethic in the
1990 Farm Bill, 12 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3 (1993) [hereinafter Malone, Jeffersonian
Ideal].
80. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 277–86 (J.P. Mayer ed.,
George Lawrence trans., First Perennial Classics 2000) (1835).
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the Jeffersonian ideal of an agrarian democracy, which in turn is
81
predicated on the independent farmer. This ideal was amplified
and shaped in Minnesota, as in many states in the upper Midwest,
by the stories of our immigrant ancestors who, with the aid of the
Homestead Act, forged new lives, often in hostile conditions on
82
Minnesota’s prairies.
But the landscape of farming in America has changed. While
83
there are still a substantial number of family farms, at the close of
the twentieth century only 124,000 people, or less than one percent
84
of our population, own over half of America’s farmland, causing
one commentator to observe that the Jeffersonian ideal of the
85
independent farmer is dead.
Nonetheless, we continue to
premise public policy decisions, including water policy, on the
family farm:
Modern economic realities . . . have undermined the
independence of the farmer and farms have ceased to be
self-sustaining . . . .
The virtual extinction of the Jeffersonian farmer,
however, did not extinguish the Jeffersonian ideal.
Congress’ reluctance to dictate environmental norms for
agriculture is rooted in a reverence for an independence
which no longer exists. . . . [T]he Jeffersonian ideal of an
agrarian democracy impeded environmental reform, and
86
wrongly so.
Fourth, and perhaps most important, is the power of the
agricultural lobbying interest. Not only do family farms constitute
a significant voting bloc, but both the agrichemical and food
processing industries are closely linked to the farming industry and
87
politically align themselves with farming interests. Additionally,
over the past decades the American Farm Bureau Federation,
which “purports to speak for all farms[,] . . . has become one of the
81. Malone, Jeffersonian Ideal, supra note 79, at 3.
82. See, e.g., O.E. ROLVAAG, GIANTS IN THE EARTH (1927). Rolvaag is the father
of Karl Rolvaag, the thirty-first governor of the State of Minnesota. Governors of
Minnesota: Karl F. Rolvaag, MINN. HIST. SOC’Y, http://www.mnhs.org
/people/governors/gov/gov_33.htm (last visited Jan. 8, 2013).
83. In 2010, ninety-six percent of all farms were family-owned. Family &
Small Farms, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., http://www.nifa.usda.gov/nea/ag_systems/in
_focus/familyfarm_if_overview.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2013).
84. Malone (1993), supra note 79, at 3.
85. Id. at 46.
86. Id.
87. Ruhl, supra note 4, at 331–32.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2013

13

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 3 [2013], Art. 16

972

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:3

most powerful lobbying forces in the nation,” consistently and
successfully fighting all attempts to impose any form of
88
environmental regulation on farms. In 1987, for example, when
Congress attempted to amend the CWA by connecting receipt of
farm subsidies to the adoption of BMPs and conservation practices,
the American Farm Bureau Federation, the National Cattlemen’s
Beef Association, and the Texas State Soil and Water Conservation
Board quickly leveraged their political resources, causing Senator
Bentsen (D-Tex) to threaten to kill the amendment unless the
linkage between farm subsidies and conservation practices was
89
dropped. Needless to say, the linkage between farm subsidies and
90
conservation practices did not make it into the final amendments.
Despite its reluctance to regulate nonpoint pollution,
Congress has attempted to grapple with the issue, relying on
planning and financial aid programs. Congress has, however, left
the heavy lifting to the states. Since 1987, Congress and the EPA
have attempted to address nonpoint source pollution through
CWA section 319 nonpoint source management programs. The
1987 CWA amendments essentially split the nonpoint world in half,
bringing urban and industrial nonpoint stormwater pollution
under the regulatory tent, but leaving agricultural nonpoint
91
pollution outside.
Agricultural pollution was to be managed
92
through the non-regulatory section 319 program —in the words of
Professor Houck, “In 1987 Congress looked agricultural pollution
93
in the eye and fainted.”
Section 319 requires the state to prepare and submit for EPA
approval a report identifying “navigable waters . . . which, without
additional action to control nonpoint sources of pollution, cannot

88. Id. at 332; see also Christopher B. Connard, Sustaining Agriculture: An
Examination of Current Legislation Promoting Sustainable Agriculture as an Alternative to
Conventional Farming Practices, 13 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 125, 133–35 (2004)
(discussing the political power of the farming industry and the American Farm
Bureau Federation in particular).
89. Oliver A. Houck, Ending the War: A Strategy to Save America’s Coastal Zone,
47 MD. L. REV. 358, 378 (1988).
90. Id. Section 208 of the CWA represents Congress’s first attempt to address
nonpoint agricultural pollution, using financial assistance to incentivize farmers to
adopt BMPs. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1281(a), (c), 1288(b)(2)(F), (j) (2006). Congress
ceased funding the section 208 program in 1981. Williams, supra note 12, at 69–
70.
91. Houck, supra note 89, at 376; Williams, supra note 12, at 72.
92. Houck, supra note 89, at 376.
93. Id. at 377.
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reasonably be expected to attain or maintain applicable water
94
quality standards”; and identifying the significant nonpoint water
95
pollution sources for said waters. Section 319 management plans
must also describe how the state will control nonpoint sources,
96
including reliance on BMPs and other “measures.” Section 319,
which relies upon a federal grant program to encourage state
97
98
compliance has, however, been notoriously underfunded.
Without the assurance of federal funding to underwrite agricultural
nonpoint programs, most states “are unwilling, or unable” to
99
aggressively attack sources of agricultural nonpoint pollution.
Minnesota’s most recent 319 report confirms that agriculture
is a primary source of sediment and nutrient pollution in impaired
lakes, rivers, and streams and has identified a number of BMPs to
address agricultural sources of sedimentation and nutrient loading
100
in Minnesota’s waters. However, section 319 authorizes but does
not require the states to adopt enforcement measures to ensure
BMPs are actually adopted; nor does it require states to penalize
101
nonpoint source polluters that fail to adopt BMPs.
Minnesota
has chosen not to undertake a regulatory regime to assure
adoption of BMPs and other conservation practices by the
102
agricultural sector, relying instead on financial incentives.
Agricultural limitations notwithstanding, section 303(d) of the
CWA could hypothetically provide an alternative avenue to tackle
103
agricultural water pollution.
Many policy analysts view section
303(d) as a “second-string safeguard” and the only real means to
104
address nonpoint agricultural pollution under the CWA. Section
303(d) uses the state’s water quality standards as the basis to set
pollution loads or “total maximum daily loads” (TMDL) for priority

94. 33 U.S.C. § 1329(a)(1)(A).
95. Id. § 1329(a)(1)(B).
96. Id. § 1329(a)(1)(C).
97. Id. § 1329(h).
98. Williams, supra note 12, at 75.
99. Id.
100. See generally MPCA, supra note 11, at ch. 8–9.
101. 33 U.S.C. § 1329(b)(2)(B); see also Robin Kundis Craig, Local or National?
The Increasing Federalization of Nonpoint Source Pollution Regulation, 15 J. ENVTL. L. &
LITIG. 179, 190 (2000).
102. See generally MPCA, supra note 11, at ch. 8–9.
103. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d).
104. Jim Vergura & Ron Jones, The TMDL Program: Land Use and Other
Implications, 6 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 317, 320 (2001).
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105

impaired water bodies.
Once the state establishes its water
standards, section 303(d) requires the state to: (1) identify water
bodies that fail to meet ambient water quality standards despite
effluent limit point source controls; (2) rank impaired water
bodies; and (3) for each impaired water body, establish TMDLs at a
106
level designed to achieve ambient water standards
(loading
107
Section 303(d) makes no distinction between point
capacity).
108
If a state fails to adopt TMDLs,
sources and nonpoint sources.
109
the EPA is authorized to promulgate TMDLs for the state.
Establishing a TMDL is only the first step in the TMDL
process. Once a TMDL is set, states are required to impose
additional controls or water quality-based effluent limits on point
110
sources through waste load allocations (WLA) incorporated in
111
Nonpoint sources are assigned
point sources’ NPDES permits.
load allocations (LA). An LA is the part of the total pollution load
112
in a TMDL that is allocated to a nonpoint source.
The TMDL is
the sum of pollutants equal to point source WLAs plus nonpoint
113
source LAs, background source allocations, and a safety margin
that a water body can receive and still meet ambient water quality
114
Theoretically the TMDL specifies the volume of a
standards.
pollutant, such as phosphorus, that a water body can receive and
still meet state water quality standards. After setting the TMDL the
115
state prepares a water quality management plan documenting
116
how it will implement the TMDL, including controlling sources
117
of nonpoint pollution. The EPA has determined that it lacks the
authority to implement TMDL nonpoint load reductions and must,

105. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d).
106. Id. § 1313(d)(1) .
107. 40 C.F.R. § 130.2(f) (2012).
108. Pronsolino v. Nastari, 291 F.3d 1123, 1137 (9th Cir. 2003). In Pronsolino
the Ninth Circuit, pointing to the House Committee Report, acknowledged that
Congress, in enacting section 303(d), recognized that the use of effluent limits to
control point sources would not result in attainment of ambient water quality
standards. Id. at 1134.
109. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(2).
110. 40 C.F.R. § 130.2(h).
111. Id. § 130.7(a).
112. Id. § 130.2(g).
113. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(C); 40 C.F.R. § 130.7(c).
114. 40 C.F.R. § 130.2(i).
115. See id. § 130.6(a).
116. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(e)(3)(F).
117. 40 C.F.R. § 130.8(b)(4).
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therefore, rely on the state to actually control nonpoint
118
pollution.
Because TMDLs are predicated on ambient water quality
standards, using TMDLs to regulate nonpoint agricultural
pollution places the states squarely in the conundrum they had
with point sources prior to the adoption of effluent limits—the
states are trying to back into control of nonpoint pollution from
water quality standards.
Meanwhile, many in the farming
community continue to sing that old refrain—that there is no
causal link between declining water quality standards and my
119
farming practices.
III. “SOMETHING’S GOTTA GIVE”
A.

The Problem with Using Voluntary Incentive Programs to Achieve
Water Quality Performance Improvements

Minnesota, like many other states, has struggled to redress
agricultural pollution outside of the NPDES program, relying
120
primarily on voluntary incentive and subsidy programs.
A
voluntary environmental program is an effort to improve
121
environmental quality that does not force participation.
Voluntary environmental programs depend on the good will of
those willing, but not required, to participate.

118. But see Michael C. Blumm & William Warnock, Roads Not Taken: EPA vs.
Clean Water, 33 ENVTL. L. 79 (2003). Blumm and Warnock argue that in large part
our failure to address our water pollution challenges is due to the EPA’s lack of
interest in pursuing a broad interpretation of the CWA, an interpretation “that
would construe some of the statute’s ambiguities to fit the scope of the nation’s
water pollution problem.” Id. at 80. Blumm and Warnock are particularly
damning of the EPA’s failure to grapple with nonpoint pollution, arguing, “It
simply has been more convenient for the EPA to treat nonpoint source pollution
as only the states’ problem, and then to interpret broadly the pollution sources it
defines as nonpoint, than to confront the difficulties of overseeing nonpoint
source control.” Id. at 110.
119. See Press Release, Minn. Soybean Research & Promotion Council,
Research Points to “Natural Causes” as Source of Most Sediment in Minnesota
River (Oct. 10, 2010), available at http://www.mnsoybean.org/images/uploads
/Satish_Gupta_Sediment_Study_final_1.pdf.
120. See generally MPCA, supra note 11, §§ 8-259 to 9-323 (discussing strategies
to address nonpoint agricultural pollution).
121. Brian M. Dowd, Daniel Press & Marc Los Huertos, Agricultural Nonpoint
Source Water Pollution Policy: The Case of California’s Central Coast, 128 AGRIC.
ECOSYSTEMS & ENV’T 151, 152 (2008).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2013

17

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 3 [2013], Art. 16

976

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:3

There are a number of federal grant programs that are used by
states, including Minnesota, to encourage farmers to voluntarily
participate in strategies to address nonpoint pollution. EPA
financial incentive programs account for approximately ten
percent of federal funding available to address nonpoint
122
agricultural pollution. As previously noted, the CWA section 319
program provides grant funding for local watershed-based
123
including agricultural BMPs and conservation
programs,
124
practices. However, by far the greatest inducement for farmers to
adopt BMPs and conservation practices is provided by the Farm
Bill, which “provide[s] 86 percent of the total federal funding
potentially available for water quality, conservation, and watershed
125
restoration projects,”
including: the Conservation Reserve
Program (CRP), which provides funding to retire environmentally
126
sensitive farmlands for ten to fifteen years; the Environmental
Quality Incentives Program (EQIP), which provides technical,
financial, and educational assistance to farmers to facilitate BMP
127
adoption;
the Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program
(CREP), which funds long-term conservation easements and
128
encourages farmers to adopt conservation practices; and the
Wildlife Habitat Incentive Program (WHIP), which funds
129
improvements to fish and wildlife habitat on agricultural lands.
Minnesota actively participates in a number of these voluntary
federal programs. The MPCA administers two assistance programs
under the umbrella of the section 319 program to encourage
watershed management of nonpoint pollution: (1) the Minnesota
Clean Water Partnership (CWP) grant program and loan program
130
and (2) the federal section 319 grant program.
Between 1997
and 2007, Minnesota invested over $91 million in section 319 and

122. Craig Cox, U.S. Agricultural Conservation Policy and Programs: History,
Trends and Implications, in U.S. AGRICULTURAL POLICY AND THE 2007 FARM BILL 124
fig.2 (Kaush Arha et al. eds., 2006); Cannon, supra note 72, at 627–28.
123. McElfish et al., supra note 4, at 96–99.
124. Cannon, supra note 72, at 627.
125. Cox, supra note 122, at 124.
126. Williams, supra note 12, at 104.
127. Id. at 109–10.
128. McElfish et al., supra note 4, at 92.
129. Id. at 94.
130. MINN. POLLUTION CONTROL AGENCY, AN OVERVIEW OF THE CLEAN WATER
PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM 1 (2009), available at http://www.pca.state.mn.us/index
.php/view-document.html?gid=10220; MPCA, supra note 11, at ES-II.
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131

Minnesota CWP projects to address nonpoint pollution
and
132
implemented 2783 BMPs. Although Minnesota keeps a record of
the number and cost of these projects, it does not actually measure
the reduction of pollution attributable to these BMPs, relying
instead on self-reported estimates provided by the eLINK modeling
133
system.
Minnesota also participates in a number of Farm Bill
conservation incentive programs, ranking third in the nation in
134
federal Farm Bill conservation funding. It has used federal Farm
Bill funding to place an estimated 80,000 acres under CREP
easements in the Minnesota River Basin and another 1.8 million
135
acres in the CRP across the state. It is, however, unclear whether
Minnesota can sustain these numbers as the acreage offered by
agricultural operators for enrollment in CREP and CRP has
136
declined, primarily because of increased land prices.
Minnesota
also participates in EQIP, the Wetlands Reserve Program, the
137
Conservation Security Program, and WHIP.
At the state level, Minnesota citizens have made significant
financial commitments to clean water. In 2006, Minnesota passed
the Clean Water Legacy Act, dedicating financial resources to
“protect, restore, and preserve the quality of Minnesota’s surface
138
waters.” The Act recognizes that nonpoint pollution sources have
a responsibility to participate and support Minnesota’s efforts to
139
achieve its water quality goals, and supports clean water by
140
Minnesotans extended their
funding assistance and incentives.
commitment to clean water in 2008, passing the Clean Water, Land

131.
132.
133.

MPCA, supra note 11, at ES-II.
Id.
MINN. POLLUTION CONTROL AGENCY, GUIDELINES FOR REPORTING
IMPLEMENTATION PROJECTS IN ELINK4WEB: EPA 319 & CLEAN WATER PARTNERSHIP
GRANTS (2009), available at http://www.pca.state.mn.us/index.php/view
-document.html?gid=6256; McElfish et al., supra note 4, at 134; Conservation
Implementation: Tools for Calculating Pollution Reduction Estimates, MINN. BOARD
WATER & SOIL RESOURCES, http://www.bwsr.state.mn.us/practices/index.html (last
visited Nov. 14, 2012).
134. MPCA, supra note 11, at 2-59 to -60.
135. Id. at 2-61.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 2-61 to -64.
138. Clean Water Legacy Act, MINN. STAT. § 114D.10, subdiv. 1 (2010).
139. Id. § 114D.10, subdiv. 2.
140. Id. § 114D.10, subdiv. 1–2.
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and Legacy Amendment (Legacy Amendment), a constitutional
amendment dedicating funding
to protect our drinking water sources; to protect,
enhance, and restore our wetlands, forests, and fish, game
and wildlife[;] . . . and to protect, enhance, and restore
our lakes, rivers, streams, and groundwater by increasing
the sales and use tax rate . . . by three-eighths of one
141
percent on taxable sales.
Thirty-three percent of the revenue raised by the sales tax
increase must “be deposited in the clean water fund and may be
spent only to protect, enhance, and restore water quality in lakes,
rivers, and streams and to protect groundwater from
142
Money generated by the Legacy Amendment
degradation.”
“must supplement traditional sources of funding [clean water] . . .
and may not be used as a substitute” to regular environmental
143
appropriations.
Money generated by the Legacy Amendment is
144
deposited in the Clean Water Fund.
One of the Clean Water Fund’s primary investments is in
voluntary BMP programs intended to redress agricultural pollution
sources. The Clean Water Council has adopted two performance
measures for Clean Water Fund expenditures related to
agricultural and other nonpoint pollution: (1) the percentage of
Clean Water Fund dollars spent on protection, restoration, and
145
implementation projects;
and (2) the number of BMPs
141. FISCAL ANALYSIS DEP’T, MINN. H.R., ISSUE BRIEF: 2008 CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENT AUTHORIZED—SALES TAX INCREASE PROPOSED FOR NATURAL RESOURCE
AND CULTURAL HERITAGE PURPOSES 1 (2008), available at http://www.house.leg
.state.mn.us/fiscal/files/ib2008Salestaxamend.pdf.
142. MINN. CONST. art. XI, § 15. Five percent of the Clean Water Fund is
dedicated to drinking water protection. FISCAL ANALYSIS DEP’T, supra note 141,
at 3.
143. FISCAL ANALYSIS DEP’T, supra note 141, at 4. Shortly after the Legacy
Amendment was passed, the legislature established the Clean Water Fund to
receive a portion of the sales tax revenues. Money deposited in the Clean Water
Fund may be spent to “prevent surface waters from becoming impaired and
to improve the quality of waters listed as impaired.” MINN. STAT. § 114D.20,
subdiv. 3(7).
144. MINN. STAT. § 114D.50.
145. MINN. POLLUTION CONTROL AGENCY ET AL., CLEAN WATER FUND
PERFORMANCE REPORT 7 (2012), available at http://www.legacy.leg.mn/sites
/default/files/resources/2012%20Clean%20Water%20Fund%20Performance
%20Report_low%20resolution%20for%20web.pdf. In fiscal year 2010–2011, the
legislature appropriated $93.5 million for protection, restoration, and
improvement activities (63% of the Clean Water Fund Appropriation). Id. The
appropriation is expected to rise to $104 million in fiscal year 2012–2013. Id.
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146

installed.
There are, however, no water quality performance
147
measures for nonpoint incentive expenditures.
Despite the significant federal and state financial investments
to address agricultural pollution through the CWA, the Farm Bill,
and the Legacy Amendment, these voluntary programs are by and
148
large considered unsatisfactory. Although billions of dollars have
been expended on these programs, skeptics note that they have
resulted in marginal success and question whether it is realistic to
expect taxpayers to continue to fund voluntary environmental
149
programs to address agricultural sources of water pollution.
Others argue that continuing to invest in voluntary incentive-based
programs may simply perpetuate “the notion that farmers must be
‘bribed’ to engage in sound, conservation-minded practices [and]
has had the subtle effect of promoting the idea that farmers have a
‘right’ to engage in environmentally destructive practices and must
150
be paid to change those practices.”
Minnesota’s experience on the Minnesota River is illustrative
of the shortcomings of these voluntary agricultural programs. As
early as 1989, it was clear that sediment, phosphorus, and nitrogen
151
loading were significant problems in the Minnesota River.
In
1992 Governor Arne Carlson announced a ten-year initiative to
152
“make the Minnesota River swimmable and fishable.”
Shortly
thereafter the Minnesota River Citizens Advisory Committee (CAC)
146. Id. at 15–16.
147. Id.
148. Cannon, supra note 72, at 628.
USDA programs include: the
Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), under which farmers are paid to commit to
enroll and convert highly erodible and environmentally sensitive lands to
vegetation cover, native grasses, trees, and riparian buffers for rental payments; the
Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program (CREP), which leverages CRP
money to enhance the CRP; the Environmental Quality Incentives Program
(EQIP), which provides technical, financial, and educational assistance to
landowners engaged in livestock and agricultural production; and the Wildlife
Habitat Incentive Program (WHIP), which provides up to a seventy-five percent
cost-share for landowners to improve fish and wildlife habitat. See McElfish et al.,
supra note 4, at 91–96 (describing USDA environmental incentive programs).
149. Williams, supra note 12, at 27–28.
150. Id. at 28.
151. KRIS SIGFORD, MINN. CTR. FOR ENVTL. ADVOCACY, MINNESOTA RIVER CLEANUP: TEN YEARS LATER 2–3 (2002), available at http://www.mncenter.org/LinkClick
.aspx?fileticket=Wu-DGUKraCg%3D&tabid =322; MINN. POLLUTION CONTROL
AGENCY, MINNESOTA RIVER BASIN PLAN 5–6 (2001), available at http://www.pca.state
.mn.us/index.php/view-document.html?gid=9946 [hereinafter MINNESOTA RIVER
BASIN PLAN].
152. MINNESOTA RIVER BASIN PLAN, supra note 151, at 6.
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recommended that drainage ditches across the Minnesota River
basin be treated as tributaries and that the state “mandate practices
153
to control runoff if voluntary compliance does not work.”
Over
the next decade Minnesota spent almost $1.2 billion on efforts to
154
Seventy
curb nonpoint pollution in the Minnesota River.
percent of this expenditure was made in payments to farmers to
155
implement conservation measures or retire farmland,
and
another $600 million was spent through CRP and CREP to
156
purchase agricultural conservation easements.
Despite these
efforts, only 100,000 acres of the seven million acres of cultivated
cropland in the Minnesota River basin were held in reserve, and
the tributaries of the Minnesota River basin still showed high levels
157
of nutrients and suspended solids, causing the Minnesota Center
for Environmental Advocacy to recommend that Minnesota adopt
agricultural
performance
standards,
target
agricultural
conservation subsidies, and improve agricultural drainage ditch
158
systems.
In 2008, twenty years after Governor
Carlson’s
pronouncement, the Minnesota River was listed by American Rivers
159
as one of the ten most endangered rivers in the United States. As
of 2009, sediment loads in the Minnesota River at St. Peter were
300% above sediment loads at Judson, making the Minnesota River
a major contributing factor in increased sedimentation rates in
160
Lake Pepin.
And while phosphorus levels have shown a modest
decrease across the basin, most declines are attributed to a
decrease in discharge rates from wastewater treatment facilities
161
managed under the NPDES program.
Further reductions are
needed to reduce high-level algae growth and to meet water quality

153. SIGFORD, supra note 151, at 2–3.
154. Id. at 10.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 7.
157. Id. at 15–17.
158. Id. at 18–21.
159. MINN. STATE UNIV., MANKATO WATER RES. CTR. ET AL., STATE OF THE
MINNESOTA RIVER: SUMMARY OF SURFACE WATER QUALITY MONITORING 2000–2008, at
3 (2009), available at http://mrbdc.mnsu.edu/sites/mrbdc.mnsu.edu/files/public
/reports/basin/state_08/2008_fullreport1109.pdf [hereinafter STATE OF THE
MINNESOTA RIVER 2008].
160. Id. at 14.
161. Minn. Pollution Control Agency, Dashboard: Environmental and Performance
Measures (2012) (on file with author).
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162

standards for the Minnesota River.
The conclusion: after twenty
years of cleanup efforts and nearly a billion dollars in public
expenditures on voluntary incentive programs intended to address
agricultural pollution, “the Minnesota River is . . . not much better
163
than it was in 1990.”
Certainly, the experience of the Minnesota
River raises the question—can we continue to rely on the same old
voluntary, incentive-based programs to address agricultural
nonpoint pollution?
B.

Four Elements Necessary for Successful Voluntary Programs

The general failure of voluntary incentive programs to
adequately address agricultural sources of water pollution is
grounded in the failure to strategically target resources to the areas
of greatest need; the reliance on the wrong performance measures;
164
and the lack of robust monitoring, reporting, and enforcement.
The literature on successful voluntary environmental programs also
suggests that voluntary environmental programs are most successful
where there is a credible enforcement threat that can be
165
implemented if voluntary programs fail.
Minnesota’s past
experience suggests that voluntary programs must meet certain
base criteria to be successful.
First, state voluntary programs must actively target those
watersheds that are most challenged and those farms that offer the
greatest opportunity to significantly improve water quality. It is not
enough to have BMPs on the ground; BMPs must be in locations
166
that matter. While participation is key to any voluntary program,
the nature of the participant greatly determines the outcome of the
program. States can no longer afford to take the first farmer that
walks in the door regardless of his or her good intentions; state
voluntary programs must target those farms where BMP
implementation will have the greatest impact on water quality.
Second, while testing and developing BMPs is essential,
adoption of BMPs without more can no longer be the measure of
167
success.
The ultimate measure of success must be sustained and
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
provides

STATE OF THE MINNESOTA RIVER 2008, supra note 159, at 16–17.
Marcotty, supra note 6.
Cannon, supra note 72, at 628.
Dowd et al., supra note 121, at 152.
Id.
McElfish et al., supra note 4, at 160 (noting that while the eLINK system
a good measure of participation, the system does not measure
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measurable improvement in water quality. Financial awards and
incentives must be premised on improved water quality. If
improvement is not detected in a reasonable time, the states, the
EPA, and the USDA must pull public investments and move on.
Additionally, if the tax-paying public is to continue to subsidize
these voluntary farm conservation programs, either through
financial incentives or through releases from government
regulation, then, as prudent managers of public resources, the
states and the EPA must provide some certainty that the public’s
investments will produce long-term results and report these results
on an ongoing basis.
Third, the states and the EPA must devote resources to
improvements in monitoring, reporting, and enforcement. They
must go into the field and determine whether BMPs are actually
performing the desired hydrologic functions. More importantly,
monitoring requires actual field measurements, not modeled
estimates of the impacts of BMPs on water quality. Surely if
Minnesota’s experience with the Minnesota River has taught
anything, it is that what was modeled (e.g., significant reductions in
soil erosion and nutrients like phosphorus and nitrogen) was not
what was actually happening in the watershed. A significant first
step in this direction would be to regularly test the outflow from
drainage ditch systems and streams in the vicinity of participating
farms.
Fourth, there must be real consequences for the failure to
participate in the voluntary program in the form of a robust
regulatory program. Such a regulatory program would serve both
as an inducement to participate in voluntary programs and a
deterrent to free riders. Without the threat of a regulatory
program, there is little new incentive for farmers to participate in a
voluntary program. In fact, the absence of a regulatory program
arguably creates a disincentive to participate in voluntary programs
to the extent that those farmers that do not participate in the
program receive the benefit of the program’s liability release
without bearing any of the burdens of implementing conservation
practices or BMPs. Can the Ag Certainty Program meet these
minimal threshold requirements?

environmental results directly).
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IV. THE PROPOSED AG CERTAINTY PROGRAM
The Ag Certainty Program is modeled on the sage grouse
conservation voluntary certainty program adopted in the West, a
program designed to preclude the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
(FWS) from placing the sage grouse on the endangered species
168
To understand how the parties intend the Ag Certainty
list.
Program to operate, it is first helpful to understand the parameters
of the Sage Grouse Initiative.
A.

The Sage Grouse Initiative

The sage grouse is a chicken-like, ground-dwelling bird whose
primary habitat is the large swaths of contiguous sagebrush that
169
historically dominated many parts of the American West.
Sage
grouse populations were once so numerous in the American West
170
that they would “blacken the sky.” Their historic range extended
across thirteen states and three Canadian provinces and totaled
171
The national sage grouse population has
463,500 square miles.
172
substantially declined, and today sage grouse occupy fifty-six
173
percent of their historic range.
It is widely believed that a significant factor contributing to the
decline of sage grouse populations is habitat destruction and
174
fragmentation attributed to development.
Unfortunately for the
sage grouse, large portions of its remaining habitat “coincide with
prime areas for natural gas development, wind energy projects,
175
grazing allotments, [and] transmission lines.”
In 2002, the FWS
176
received a petition to list the sage grouse. What ensued was a tale
168. Press Release, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, supra note 15; Janet Kubat
Willette, Ag Water Quality Advisory Council Holds First Meeting, AGRINEWS (Aug. 13,
2012, 12:56 PM), http://www.agrinews.com/printStory.php?storyID=4731.
169. 12-Month Findings for Petitions to List the Greater Sage-Grouse
(Centrocercus urophasianus) as Threatened or Endangered, 75 Fed. Reg. 13,910,
13,912, 13,916 (proposed Mar. 23, 2010).
170. Elizabeth A. Schulte, The Sage Grouse Rebellion, 25 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T
59, 59 (2011). In 1950, the estimated sage grouse population was between 1.6 and
16 million. 75 Fed. Reg. at 13,920.
171. 75 Fed. Reg. at 13,917.
172. Id. at 13.921. Current population estimates range from 100,000 to
500,000. Id.
173. Id. at 13.917.
174. Id. at 13.923.
175. Schulte, supra note 170, at 60.
176. 75 Fed. Reg. at 13.910. The sage grouse was designated as a potential
candidate for listing in 1985. Id.
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of high drama that had all “the hallmarks of a Hollywood western,
featuring conflict and intrigue among the tumbleweed, federal
agents accused of tampering with information and intimidating
personnel, and a ‘hanging judge’ striking down perceived outlaw
177
behavior.”
The drama was caused in part by the constraints of
the Endangered Species Act (ESA). The ESA extends protections
178
to listed endangered and threatened species,
including the
179
The FWS has broad discretion to
designation of critical habitat.
determine which species merit listing as threatened or endangered,
but listing determinations must be made “on the basis of the best
180
scientific and commercial data available.” Once a species is listed
181
the FWS is required to designate critical habitat.
Listing affords listed species certain protections, including
182
The taking of a species includes
protection from “takes.”
harming the species—any act that kills or injures wildlife; harm
includes “significant habitat modification or degradation” that may
183
impair a species’ essential behavioral patterns.
Listing the sage
grouse and the designation of its critical habitat would substantially
constrain energy development and ranching activities on both
184
private and federal lands,
adversely impacting regional
185
economies. The potential impacts of a sage grouse listing caused
Interior Secretary Norton to characterize the sage grouse as the
177. Schulte, supra note 170, at 59.
178. The ESA requires federal agencies to limit actions that would “take”
listed species and prohibits commercial or private “takings” of species or their
habitat. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1536(a), 1538(a) (2006). For a detailed discussion of the
legislative history of the ESA and the listing process, see generally Sherry A. Enzler
& Jeremy T. Bruskotter, Contested Definitions of Endangered Species: The Controversy
Regarding How to Interpret the Phrase “A Significant Portion of a Species’ Range” 27 VA.
ENVTL. L.J. 1 (2009).
179. § 1532(5)(A)(i).
180. Id. § 1533 (b)(1)(A).
181. Id. § 1533 (a)(3)(A)(i). Critical habitat is “the specific areas within the
geographical area occupied by the species, at the time it is listed . . . , on which are
found those physical or biological features (I) essential to the conservation of the
species and (II) which may require special management considerations or
protection . . . .” Id. § 1532(5)(A)(i).
182. Id. §§ 1532(19), 1538(a)(1)(B).
183. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2012). See generally Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of
Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687 (1995) (affirming the FWS definition of
“take” to include habitat destruction).
184. Amanda R. Garcia, The Sage Grouse Debate: Cost-Benefit Analysis and the
Discourse of the Endangered Species Act, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 572, 596–98 (2006)
(discussing the economic impacts of listing the sage grouse).
185. Robert Tee Spjute, Weathering the Storm: Finding Safe Harbors in ESA
Controversy, 30 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 331, 339 (2010).
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186

“spotted owl of the Intermountain West”
and launched a
187
proposal to amend the ESA.
One management strategy put forward by the federal
government to avoid a protracted and a potentially brutal listing
fight was to promote the adoption of voluntary conservation
agreements (VCA), encouraging landowners to voluntarily set aside
and restore habitat in order to avoid species listings and the
188
restraints imposed by critical habitat designation.
Theoretically,
the threat of listing together with the ESA’s regulatory restrictions
on land use would serve as a hammer inducing participation in
189
habitat conservation programs.
Additionally, the potential ESA
regulatory restrictions would act as a deterrent to removing lands
from conservation status as commodity market and land prices
increase.
In exchange for entering into VCAs, individual
landowners would receive assurances that in the event of a sage
grouse listing, VCA participants would be exempt from more
extensive land use restrictions that might be imposed by critical
190
habitat designation.
VCA participants may or may not receive
191
It was
monetary payments to further induce participation.
release from the regulatory constraints of the ESA that served as
192
the primary inducement to participate in the VCA program.
A
secondary inducement is the fact that if the cumulative impact of
VCAs increased species populations, the need to list would be
negated.
In 2010, the FWS and the Natural Resources Conservation
Service (NRCS) entered into a collaborative agreement to
undertake landscape-level habitat improvements across the sage
193
grouse range through the Sage Grouse Initiative (SGI). The SGI
186. Garcia, supra note 184, at 575.
187. Id. at 574.
188. Andrew G. Frank, Reforming the Endangered Species Act: Voluntary
Conservation Agreements, Government Compensation and Incentives for Private Action, 22
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 137, 144 (1997).
189. Id.
190. Id. at 146–47.
191. Gregory A. Hicks, Protecting and Promoting Wildlife Habitat on State and
Private Land in Washington’s Arid Interior, 4 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 13,
16 (1997).
192. Frank, supra note 188, at 146–47.
193. See generally FISH AND WILDLIFE SERV., CONFERENCE REPORT FOR THE
NATURAL RESOURCES CONSERVATION SERVICE SAGE-GROUSE INITIATIVE (SGI) 6, app. 1
(2010), available at ftp://ftp-fc.sc.egov.usda.gov/ID/programs/sage-grouse/sg
_conference_report_073010.pdf;
NATURAL
RES.
CONSERVATION
SERV.,
INTRODUCTION TO NRCS’ NEW SAGE-GROUSE INITIATIVE: WILDLIFE CONSERVATION
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strategically uses VCAs to preserve sage grouse habitat in sage
grouse “core areas” with the ultimate goal of increasing sage grouse
194
populations to meet a seventy-five percent abundance threshold.
195
Meeting this goal would preclude the need to list the species.
The NRCS took the lead in enlisting landowners using VCAs.
By entering into VCAs, individual landowners were assured that
they would be insulated from future ESA land use restrictions in
196
This protection was
the event the sage grouse was listed.
afforded because, by participating in the SGI, the landowner was
already engaged in the habitat protection necessary to restore
197
species populations.
The SGI included regular scientific
monitoring to assess the status of sage grouse populations and their
response to habitat conservation practices, and to assure
198
attainment of long-term sage grouse restoration goals.
Landowners that participated in the SGI were also eligible for
199
federal WHIP and EQIP grant funding.
The SGI has several important features of effective voluntary
programs. First, the SGI has strategic natural resource targets.
Efforts expended under the initiative are focused or targeted on
core areas—areas of habitat important to sage grouse viability and
geographic areas most likely to contribute to species viability.
Second, the SGI has a specific resource-based goal—increased sage
grouse populations to meet the seventy-five percent abundance
200
threshold.
The goal’s focus is increased viability of the sage
grouse, not the number of acres under VCAs. Third, actual field
measurements and monitoring of sage grouse populations are used
to determine the success or failure of the SGI. Finally, the initiative
is supported by a regulatory scheme with significant consequences

THROUGH SUSTAINABLE RANCHING (2010) [hereinafter INTRODUCTION TO NRCS’
NEW SAGE-GROUSE INITIATIVE], available at http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/Internet/FSE
_DOCUMENTS/nrcsdev11_023946.pdf.
194. See INTRODUCTION TO NRCS’ NEW SAGE-GROUSE INITIATIVE, supra note 193,
at 4.
195. Id. at 6.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 7.
199. Greater Sage-Grouse Working Lands for Wildlife Initiative, WYO. NAT’L
RESOURCES CONSERVATION SERVICE, http://www.wy.nrcs.usda.gov/programs/SGI
/SGI_EQIP.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2013). See supra note 148 for a description
of WHIP and EQIP.
200. INTRODUCTION TO NRCS’ NEW SAGE-GROUSE INITIATIVE, supra note 193,
at 4.
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for failure to participate and/or failure to comply with the VCAs’
habitat restoration terms. If the VCA strategy fails, the sage grouse
will be listed, critical habitat will be designated, and with that
designation will come significant land use restrictions and
regulations. It is the ESA stick that provides inducement to
participate in the program and the release of ESA regulatory
constraints provided by the VCAs that are the incentive to the
landowner to participate in the program. This incentive, unlike
monetary incentives, has the benefit of maintaining VCAs over time
as land values increase. This brief analysis of the SGI suggests that
the SGI is more likely to meet natural resource goals and increase
sage grouse viability because it embodies the key elements
necessary for a successful, voluntary environmental program. Sage
grouse viability is not dependent upon random acts of
conservation.
B.

Applying the Lessons of the SGI to the Ag Certainty Program

It is unclear whether the Ag Certainty Program will
incorporate the threshold elements necessary to ensure improved
water quality. The federal-state Ag Certainty MOU does not
provide significant insight into how Minnesota’s Ag Certainty
Program will operate. The MOU indicates that Minnesota will
develop and implement a certification program designed to
encourage BMP adoption by agricultural producers while assuring
agricultural producers that, by participating in the Ag Certainty
Program, they are meeting federal and state water quality goals and
201
standards.
A Technical Advisory Committee (TAC) will be
formed to develop and implement the certification to “support”
202
state water quality standards and goals.
The state and federal
partners also agreed to prioritize state and federal funding to
203
support the program’s development and implementation.
Further insight into how the federal partners intend the Ag
Certainty Program to operate may be gleaned from the July 2011

201. STATE OF MINN., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. & U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
ENGAGING IN A STATE AND FEDERAL PARTNERSHIP IN SUPPORT OF THE MINNESOTA
AGRICULTURAL WATER QUALITY CERTIFICATION PROGRAM 2 (2012) [hereinafter
MOU], available at http://www.mda.state.mn.us/protecting/waterprotection
/~/media/Files/protecting/waterprotection/awqcmou.ashx.
202. Id. at 2.
203. Id.
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204

EPA-USDA Certainty Framework (Certainty Framework).
According to the Certainty Framework, two of the primary goals of
the Ag Certainty Program are: (1) increasing adoption of
conservation practices and BMPs by agricultural producers and (2)
providing assurances to the agricultural operations that
“investments in conservation practices” will yield economic and
environmental returns “consistent with state water quality
205
programs.”
Interestingly, conferring certainty on producers for
BMP implementation does not relieve the state of its obligation to
meet TMDL allocations—the state would simply be required to
206
look to other pollution sources to meet allocation requirements.
What is particularly problematic is that the Certainty
Framework does not include any of the essential elements of
successful voluntary environmental programs. Outside of the
indirect reference to environmental returns, there is scant
reference to improved water quality in either the goals or objectives
207
outlined in the Certainty Framework. Unlike the SGI agreement
between the FWS and the NRCS, which established both a clear
recovery goal for the sage grouse and targeted federal investments
208
to agricultural operations that are “core” sage grouse areas, there
is no suggestion in the Certainty Framework that federal and state
investments should target those water bodies posing either the
greatest water quality challenge or the greatest opportunity for
water quality improvement. Nor is there any suggestion that the
EPA abandon its voluntary-only approach if the Ag Certainty
Program fails. Thus, there is no meaningful federal regulatory
threat to induce long-term participation, a factor that was
particularly important to the success of the SGI. If, then, the Ag
Certainty Program is to incorporate those elements essential to
successful voluntary programs, it will be left to the State of
Minnesota and TAC to include them in the Ag Certainty Program
204. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY & U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., CERTAINTY FRAMEWORK
1 (2011) [hereinafter CERTAINTY FRAMEWORK], available at http://www.mn.nrcs
.usda.gov/partnerships/mstc/2011_Oct25/Certainty%20Framework%20FINAL
%20july%2019%202011.pdf.
205. Id. at 1.
206. Id. Looking to regulated pollution sources for further pollution
reductions is inequitable. Hypothetically, if there is no improvement in water
quality, the state would look to other sources, including point sources, to reduce
pollution loads, even though said sources have significantly reduced their
pollution loads under the terms of their WLAs and NPDES permits.
207. Id.
208. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
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design.
Early indications that the state will take on this task are not
particularly hopeful. In the spring of 2011, MnDAg announced the
membership of the TAC. Of the fifteen members, only three
represent environmental interests, while agricultural business
interests, including the Minnesota Farm Bureau, the major
209
commodity groups, and individual farmers, hold nine seats. The
very membership of TAC suggests to some that the integrity of
Minnesota’s waters over the next five to ten years will be left in the
210
hands of agricultural business interests.
The TAC Charge does leave room to incorporate some of the
211
elements of successful voluntary environmental programs.
The
TAC Charge directs TAC to develop a “voluntary” program that
enhances adoption of BMPs to improve water quality while
providing participating agricultural producers the regulatory
212
certainty that “our water resources and farmers both deserve.”
This directive is sufficiently vague so as to permit TAC to
recommend both water quality targeting and goals. However, the
primary thrust of the TAC Charge appears to be to encourage
program enrollment with little attention given to water quality
outcomes. The five specific questions and the numerous subquestions included in the TAC Charge are directed toward
participant identification, the scope of certification, the certainty
provided to agricultural producers, technical assistance,
identification of additional incentives to further induce
213
participation, and program management.
Only one of the subquestions remotely addresses water quality targeting—“Should the
certification program be a whole farm approach or [target] specific
214
segments related to water quality?”
A plain reading of the TAC
209. Minnesota Agricultural Water Quality Certification Program: Advisory
Committee, MINN. DEPARTMENT AGRIC., http://www.mda.state.mn.us/protecting
/waterprotection/awqcprogram/committeemembers.aspx (last visited Jan. 8,
2013).
210. Don Shelby, Cities, Industries Have Reduced Their Mississippi River
Pollution—Now It’s Farmers’ Turn, MINNPOST (Jan. 31, 2012), http://www.minnpost
.com/environment/2012/01/cities-industries-have-reduced-their-mississippi-river
-pollution-%E2%80%94-now-its-farme.
211. MINN. DEP’T OF AGRIC., CHARGE TO THE MINNESOTA AGRICULTURAL WATER
QUALITY CERTIFICATION PROGRAM TECHNICAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE (2012)
[hereinafter TAC CHARGE].
212. Id. at 1.
213. Id. at 1–2.
214. Id. at 1.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2013

31

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 3 [2013], Art. 16

990

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:3

Charge indicates the only real discernible distinction between the
Ag Certainty Program and other voluntary agricultural water
quality programs is the addition of “certainty” or the release from
potential future liability. In comparing the parameters of the Ag
Certainty Program TAC Charge with the SGI parameters, it is clear
that the only significant parallel between the two programs is the
“regulatory certainty” that both programs are intended to provide.
In June 2012, before the first meeting of TAC, the NRCS
Minnesota State Technical Committee Subcommittee on Certainty
(MSTC Subcommittee) submitted a set of “recommendations” to
the Minnesota Agriculture Commissioner outlining how
215
Minnesota’s Ag Certainty Program should operate.
These
recommendations were presented to TAC for consideration at its
216
The MSTC Subcommittee
July 30, 2012, meeting.
recommendations do not embrace the core elements of successful
voluntary environmental programs; rather, they support adopting
the elements of failed voluntary, incentive-based water quality
programs.
First, although the MSTC Subcommittee recommends
targeting the Ag Certainty Program, the targets are not resource
based. It recommends the Ag Certainty Program target a handful
of watersheds where there is a diversity of land use and where
agricultural producers have willingly participated in voluntary,
217
incentive-based water quality programs in the past,
a

215. The July 30, 2012, TAC minutes characterize the MSTC Subcommittee
submittal as recommendations, although the MSTC Subcommittee characterizes
the submittal as a response to questions posed to the MSTC by the Minnesota
Commissioner of Agriculture.
Minn. Agric. Water Quality Certification
Program Advisory Comm., July 30, 2012 Minutes, MINN. DEPARTMENT AGRIC.
(July
30,
2012),
http://www.mda.state.mn.us/protecting/waterprotection
/awqcprogram/minutesandagendas/july302012minutes.aspx [hereinafter July 30,
2012 Minutes]; Letter from Don Baloun, State Conservationist, NRCS, & Warren
Formo, Exec. Dir., Minn. Agric. Water Res. Ctr., to David Frederickson, Comm’r,
Minn. Dep’t of Agric. (June 27, 2012) (on file with author). Interestingly, the
Minnesota Agricultural Water Resources Center is a membership organization
whose membership is exclusively composed of the major agricultural commodity
organizations and the Minnesota Farm Bureau. MAWRC Member Organizations,
MINN. AGRIC. WATER RESOURCE CENTER, http://www.mawrc.org/mawrc
-members.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2013).
216. July 30, 2012 Minutes, supra note 215.
217. Memorandum from MSTC Subcomm. to David J. Frederickson, Comm’r
of Agric. (June 27, 2012), available at http://www.mn.nrcs.usda.gov/partnerships
/mstc/2012_July12/Final%20NRCS%20subcommittee%20report%20w%20cover
%20letter.pdf.
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218

recommendation adopted in part by the TAC.
This
recommendation perpetuates one of the significant flaws of past
voluntary agricultural incentive-based programs—the failure to
target programs to those areas most likely to result in the greatest
water quality improvement or those watersheds with the greatest
impairments. This recommendation deviates from the SGI, on
which the Ag Certainty Program is purportedly modeled. The
SGI’s strategic targets are resource based—those core sage grouse
areas likely to increase the viability of the species. The target was
linked to a concrete resource goal—increased viability of the sage
grouse. It was the sage grouse that drove participant selection; the
willingness of agricultural producers to participate in the program
was a secondary factor. If the Ag Certainty Program is to succeed in
improving our water quality, TAC must target watersheds with the
greatest impairment or watersheds where the implementation of
BMPs have the greatest likelihood of significantly improving
ambient water quality in the receiving body.
Second, the MSTC Subcommittee recommendations make
little reference to actual improvements of water quality. Its
recommended program goal appears to be to assure the public that
certified farms are managed responsibly to improve water quality
while improving the public’s understanding of agricultural
219
production systems and the scope of BMP implementation. And
while the MSTC Subcommittee lists improved water quality as an
outcome, it does not recommend establishing quantifiable water
220
quality goals for the Ag Certainty Program.
Rather, it suggests
adopting a “trust us” standard—trust that if we enter into these
agreements and implement conservation measures and BMPs, the
water will improve. This strategy was also largely adopted by TAC,
whose recommendations focus on BMP implementation rather
than water quality improvement goals, assuming that BMP
221
implementation will result in improved water quality.
This
218. The TAC recommendation is limited to a handful of watersheds in the
state’s three agricultural subregions, representing a diversity of agricultural
production. Memorandum from the Minn. Agric. Water Quality Certification
Program Advisory Comm. to David J. Frederickson, Comm’r of Agric. 2 (Nov. 14,
2012), available at http://www.mda.state.mn.us/protecting/waterprotection
/~/media/Files/protecting/waterprotection/mawqcpadcomrecs2012.ashx.
219. Memorandum from MSTC Subcomm. to David J. Frederickson, supra
note 217.
220. Id.
221. See generally Memorandum from the Minn. Agric. Water Quality
Certification Program Advisory Comm. to David J. Frederickson, supra note 218.
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approach stands in sharp contrast to the SGI, which set a concrete
and quantifiable resource goal for the SGI—an increase in sage
grouse populations.
If the Ag Certainty Program is to improve Minnesota’s water
quality, then TAC must set actual, quantifiable water quality goals
for both the participating watersheds (interim water quality
standards) and the participants in the program (quantifiable load
reductions). This could be done by setting interim ambient water
quality goals for the selected watershed and at the same time
establishing quantifiable load reduction goals for program
participants. The latter could be monitored by testing discharge
from the drainage ditch systems of participating agricultural
producers.
This strategy has been particularly successful in the Everglades,
where the Everglades Forever Act (EFA) and a consent decree
require agricultural producers to meet a quantitative phosphorus
reduction schedule designed to meet an interim ambient
phosphorus water quality standard of fifty ppb and a long-term
222
ambient phosphorus water quality standard of ten ppb.
As a
result of this strategy, by 2005, phosphorus levels in the Everglades
223
had dropped to fifty ppb.
Third, although the MSTC Subcommittee recommends that
the state use independent, third-party certifiers to approve
participants’ conservation plans and verify plan implementation
and BMP placement, it does not recommend testing or
224
While review of conservation plans and verification
monitoring.
of plan implementation is an important aspect of this program, the
Minnesota River experience demonstrates that verification of BMP
222. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 373.4592 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. Sess.);
United States v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., No. 88-1886-CIV-HOEVELER (S.D. Fla.
Apr. 27, 2001) (omnibus order approving 1995 request to modify
settlement
agreement
to
reflect
the
provisions
of
the
EFA),
available at http://www.evergladeshub.com/lit/LEGAL/Hoeveler01-USA-Micco
-8-1886civHoeveler-Decree-010427.pdf. The sugar industry agreed to meet rolling
phosphorus reduction goals for discharges coming off sugar fields to assure
progress toward the ambient water quality goals of fifty ppb and ten ppb. U.S.
SEC’Y OF THE INTERIOR ET AL., STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES (1993), available at
http://www.law.miami.edu/library/everglades/ (follow “Documents” hyperlink;
then follow “Statement of Principles” hyperlink).
223. NAT’L PARK SERV. & S. FLA. NATURAL RES. CTR., JOINT REPORT TO
CONGRESS: EVERGLADES WATER QUALITY 16 (2005), available at http://
digitalcollections.fiu.edu/sfrc/pdfs/FI11060808.pdf.
224. Memorandum from MSTC Subcomm. to David J. Frederickson, supra
note 217.
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placement and estimates of pollution load reductions using eLink
are not sufficient to ensure that the program is actually yielding
results in the form of cleaner water. TAC has proposed using a
modified Water Quality Index and Conservation Measurement
Tool, but it is unclear whether either of these tools will require
actual detailed water monitoring—as opposed to the SGI, which
actually monitored bird populations throughout the course of
225
program implementation.
Finally, it is clear that one of the most important elements of
successful voluntary environmental programs is the threat of
regulatory controls. In the case of the SGI, it was the threat of a
sage grouse ESA listing coupled with the associated land use
restrictions that motivated participation by agricultural producers.
There is no existing regulatory leverage in Minnesota. The MPCA
has consistently relied upon voluntary programs to address
226
agricultural nonpoint pollution. Neither the TAC Charge nor
227
suggest that
the MSTC Subcommittee recommendations
agricultural producers that choose not to participate in the
program should or will face actual regulatory controls.
Although Governor Dayton apparently understands that a
regulatory threat might be necessary to ensure program success,
there is no history to suggest that Minnesota is willing to take the
regulatory step. Absent some concrete indication to agricultural
operators that Minnesota intends to regulate agricultural nonpoint
pollution, Dayton’s threat that those agricultural producers that do
not participate in the Ag Certainty Program may be forced to do so
228
by law is little more than a hollow threat. This is not to say that,
with a little creativity, Minnesota could not legally require
agricultural operators to abate water pollution.
For example, Minnesota Statutes section 115.061 imposes a
229
duty to report and abate the discharge
“of any substance or
225. Memorandum from the Minn. Agric. Water Quality Certification
Program Advisory Comm. to David J. Frederickson, supra note 218, at 5. Nor do
the final TAC recommendations include a requirement to measure water quality,
relying instead on a modification of the Conservation Measurement Tool and
Water Quality Index, both modeling formulas designed to assess the anticipated
water benefits of BMPs. Id.
226. See generally TAC CHARGE supra note 211.
227. See generally Memorandum from MSTC Subcomm. to David J.
Frederickson, supra note 217.
228. Shelby, supra note 210.
229. A discharge is “the addition of any pollutant to the waters of the
state . . . .” MINN. STAT. § 115.01, subdiv. 4 (2010).
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230

material” that may cause water pollution.
Violators may be
required to pay remediation and restoration costs and may be
231
subject to a civil penalty of up to $10,000 a day. Although section
115.071 contains an agricultural exemption, the exemption is
limited “to air and land pollution caused by” non-permitted
232
agricultural operations.
Land pollution involves the disposal of
233
including “solid waste, sewage sludge, . . .
waste on land,
234
hazardous waste,” garbage, refuse, and sludge from agricultural
235
operations.
Sediment discharged from agricultural operations
into Minnesota’s rivers, lakes, and streams is essentially loose sand,
236
clay, silt, and soil carried by runoff. It is not land pollution. As
such, sediment discharge falls outside the land pollution
exemption—it is a discharge of a substance or material causing
water pollution within the purview of section 115.061(a) and
subject to regulation. The threat of a civil penalty for discharging
sediments into the waters of the state in violation of Minnesota
Statutes section 115.071 could constitute a sufficient regulatory
threat to induce long-term participation in the Ag Certainty
Program, should the state choose to use the threat.
In short, for the Ag Certainty Program to be successful,
Minnesota must actually be prepared to impose regulatory
restraints on those agricultural operations that do not choose to
participate in the Ag Certainty Program. Absent such a threat, it is
230. Id. § 115.061(a) (emphasis added).
231. Id. § 115.071, subdiv. 3.
232. Id. (emphasis added).
233. Land pollution is “the presence in or on the land of any waste in such
quantity, of such nature and duration, and under such condition as would affect
injuriously any waters of the state.” Id. § 116.06, subdiv. 14.
234. Id. § 115A.03, subdiv. 34. Hazardous waste is
any refuse, sludge, or other water material or combination of refuse,
sludge or other waste materials in solid, semisolid, liquid, or contained
gaseous form which because of its quantity, concentration, or chemical,
physical, or infectious characteristics may (a) cause or significantly
contribute to an increase in mortality or an increase in serious
irreversible, or incapacitating reversible illness; or (b) pose a substantial
present or potential hazard to human health or the environment when
improperly treated, stored, transported, or disposed of, or otherwise
managed.
Id. §116.06, subdiv. 11.
235. Id. § 116.06, subdiv. 22.
236. See MID-AM. REG’L COUNCIL, WHAT IS SEDIMENT POLLUTION? (n.d.),
available at http://cfpub.epa.gov/npstbx/files/KSMO_Sediment.pdf; Sediments,
U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://water.epa.gov/polwaste/sediments/ (last
updated Jan. 31, 2012).
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unclear that the release provided by the Ag Certainty Agreements
will be a sufficient inducement to encourage meaningful
participation in the program. And those agricultural producers
that choose not to participate in the Ag Certainty Program will
indirectly reap the benefit created by participating producers.
Because if the state is unwilling to regulate for the five or ten years
it takes to test this program, the non-participants will get a five-toten year pollution entitlement.
V. CONCLUSION
In passing the Legacy Amendment, the citizens of Minnesota
evidenced both a commitment to clean water and a willingness to
expend public resources to ensure a clean water legacy for future
generations of Minnesotans. One of Minnesota’s greatest clean
water challenges is agricultural nonpoint pollution. A meaningful
method of controlling agricultural pollution is essential to ensure
Minnesota’s clean-water legacy. To date, Minnesota has relied on
voluntary, incentive-based programs to meet the challenges posed
by agricultural water pollution. But voluntary, incentive-based
programs have been unsuccessful. An analysis of these failed
programs, together with an analysis of the SGI, suggests that
voluntary environmental programs can be successful if the
incentives are targeted to improve water quality, the program
includes quantifiable resource/water quality goals, both participant
performance and the resource are monitored throughout the life
of the program, and the program is backed by the threat of real
regulatory controls.
The Minnesota Ag Certainty Program proposes a new
approach to address agricultural water pollution. It uses the
release from future regulation and financial incentives to
encourage agricultural producers to participate in conservation
practices. However, simply adding the inducement of regulatory
certainty without more will not result in improved water quality.
To ensure performance, the architects of the Minnesota Ag
Certainty Program must target challenged watershed and
agricultural operations presenting the greatest opportunity to
improve water quality. They must set numeric water quality goals
and continuously measure water quality to assure program
performance. Finally, Minnesota must support the program with a
meaningful threat to regulate agricultural water pollution. Without
these parameters, Minnesotans have no more than a vague
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assurance that the Minnesota Ag Certainty Program will result in
improved water quality. Certainly the citizens of Minnesota, in
passing the Legacy Amendment, expected that their investment in
Minnesota’s waters would result in more than a vague assurance
that farmers are managing their farms responsibly to improve water
237
quality.

237. See Memorandum from MSTC Subcomm. to David J. Frederickson, supra
note 217 (addressing questions about what assurances the program provides to the
public).
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